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Icebreakers in Anglo-Russian Relations (1914-21) 
 
David Saunders* 
 
Foreign supply to Russia in the First World War is familiar terrain,1 but although 
the present paper engages to some degree with the military, diplomatic, and 
especially economic aspects of the subject, its primary affiliations lie elsewhere. 
Its principal purpose is to discuss the icebreakers on which it concentrates not 
only just before but also just after Russia’s withdrawal from the First World War, 
with a view to contrasting the first phase of the ships’ history with the second 
and highlighting the perennially ambivalent character of the Anglo-Russian 
relationship. On the way, it points out the geographical limitations of the 
Russian Empire by drawing attention to the fact that it was almost land-locked 
between 1914 and 1917; ventures into the history of the part of Britain in which 
the ships were built in order to show that a region which is sometimes thought 
to be introspective was once outward-looking; makes a contribution to 
environmental history by speaking of the difficulty of sailing in Arctic and sub-
Arctic waters; develops an aspect of the history of technology by focussing on a 
class of vessel which was relatively new in the early twentieth century; and even 
engages, towards the end, with a key period in the life of an important figure in 
Russian literary history. Thus its remit is broad.  
 Russia had a particular need for icebreakers in the First World War 
because Germany and the Ottoman Empire prevented it from using its ports on 
the Baltic and the Black Sea. Since these were the country’s principal maritime 
outlets, ‘Contemporaries accurately compared Russia with an apartment block 
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whose doors and windows had been boarded up, so that the householders had 
to deal with the outside world via stove-pipes and water-pipes.’2  
 The ‘stove-pipes’ were Russia’s two wartime land routes to the West: via 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the North Sea, and via Karelia and the Kola 
Peninsula to the Murman coast in the Arctic Circle. The first, the route usually 
taken by individuals and small groups, was unsuitable for cargoes. Although the 
second involved fewer international borders and more sea than land, it was not 
viable at the beginning of the war because Russia had not yet built the 
Murmansk railroad or Murmansk itself. The Russian authorities understood that 
these things were necessary and soon began work on them, but they were not 
to be fully operational until after the tsarist regime fell. 
 For the conveyance of large cargoes, therefore, Russia had to make best 
use of its ‘water-pipes’, the Pacific and the White Sea. Both of these suffered 
from significant drawbacks. The first was a very long way from the principal 
theatres of war. Although the Trans-Siberian Railroad connected the Pacific 
with the heart of the Russian Empire, it was still, at this time, single-track. 
Consequently, managing the despatch of goods from Vladivostok to the front 
caused the regime major headaches. By the middle of the war, they were piling 
up at Cheliabinsk just to the east of the Urals,3 still a long way from where most 
of them were needed. 
 This left the White Sea, the gateway to the Arctic, where Archangel on the 
southern shore was the principal port and Soroka, Kem, and Kandalaksha on 
the western shore offered additional possibilities for the receipt of goods. 
Although reaching harbours at such high latitudes from Britain and France was 
not easy, and although the threat of German mines made getting to them riskier 
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still, at least they were in the European part of the Russian Empire. Icebreakers 
would make them accessible for more of the year. 
 Admittedly, lack of icebreakers had not prevented Archangel from being 
something of a focus of connections between Britain and Russia prior to the 
First World War. The early twentieth century was not the first time that Russia 
had been virtually landlocked. Richard Chancellor had inaugurated the entire 
modern history of Anglo-Russian relations when, in 1553, he landed in the 
White Sea near the spot on which Archangel was to be founded.4 The late 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century British merchant and diplomat Sir 
John Merrick entered and left Muscovy via Archangel on a number of 
occasions.5 King James I of England contemplated military intervention in the 
northern part of Muscovy in 1613.6 The elder John Tradescant, one of the first 
great English naturalists, collected plants in the delta of the Northern Dvina in 
1618.7 The inveterate Cornish traveller Peter Mundy wrote a wide-ranging 
description of the area after spending a month there in 1641.8 Although British 
merchants were less important than their Dutch rivals at Archangel for most of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,9 by the end of the eighteenth century 
the port was deriving 20 or 30 per cent of its turnover from dealings with 
Britain.10 After enlisting on a British ship at Archangel in 1804, Ivan Spekhin, a 
peasant from Archangel province, saw England, the Cape of Good Hope, the 
West Indies, and Surinam before returning home a decade later.11 The 
grievances of the merchant who assassinated Britain’s Prime Minister in the 
lobby of the House of Commons in 1812 stemmed from a period of 
imprisonment at Archangel.12 By the time Britain opened a consulate at 
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Archangel at the beginning of the 1820s, British ships were in the ascendancy 
there.13  
 Although the most striking developments in Russia’s external trade in the 
later nineteenth century took place in the southern rather than the northern part 
of the Russian Empire, Britain and Archangel did not lose touch with one 
another. Indeed, by the middle of the nineteenth century elements of a Russian-
English pidgin language were being recorded in Solombala, the docks district of 
Archangel.14 Joseph Wiggins, one of north-east England’s most ambitious 
mariners, called at Archangel in 1875 in the course of one of his many 
investigations of the possibilities of the Northern Sea Route.15 The Archangel-
Murman Express Steam Navigation Company ordered new steamers in north-
east England and Scotland in the 1890s and just before the First World War.16 
The half-Scottish Eugenie Fraser grew up in Archangel at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.17 The British traveller Stephen Graham brought the city to life 
in a travellogue of 1912.18 Thus Britain knew something of Russia’s European 
north long before the First World War began. 
 The British may have known the region almost as well as the tsarist 
authorities, for, to judge by the fact that Sergei Witte, the Russian Minister of 
Finances, had not succeeded in his attempt to promote the use of the Murman 
Coast in the 1890s,19 St Petersburg had been unenthusiastic about the north 
prior to 1914. When war broke out, however, the tsar’s ministers realized that 
the White Sea and the Arctic would have to play a much larger part in their 
plans. On 30 July / 12 August 1914 they decided to buy coal in England and 
procure an icebreaker to lengthen the period of time when it could be imported 
via Archangel,20 acknowledging, then and in the next few months, that 
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Vladivostok needed more ships if it was to deal effectively with North America, 
that getting to the west via Scandinavia involved multiple difficulties, and that 
communicating with Britain via Karelia and the Murman coast could not become 
a realistic possibility until Russia had built a continuous railway line in that 
direction.21 
 But where were the tsarist authorities to get the icebreakers they needed? 
The first thing they did was buy Earl Grey and J. L. Horne in Canada, renaming 
them Kanada and Solombala.22 Unfortunately, this initiative was not 
immediately successful, for the first of the two ships broke down in January 
1915 and the second took longer than expected to cross the Atlantic.23 These 
ships had anyway been built for service on the Great Lakes of North America, 
which meant, to quote Russia’s Navy Minister, that they were ‘not really 
icebreakers in the full sense of the word but steamers with a capacity to smash 
ice’.24 The Minister accepted, however, that equipping Archangel with effective 
icebreakers was essential. ‘With every day,’ he confided to his diary,  
the question of Archangel becomes so serious that it necessitates taking 
immediate steps to secure the capacity of this port to accept the cargoes 
coming to us – for us [the navy] basically coal for future voyages, but 
mainly cargoes for the War Department, which is placing huge orders 
abroad, since, although [they said] they ‘were prepared for war’, in reality 
they have turned out to be unprepared in every respect.25  
The Council of Ministers shared the Navy Minister’s view of the urgency of the 
situation. To repair Kanada, to get important military cargoes into Archangel in 
January and February 1915, and to open navigation there as early as possible 
in the spring of the coming year, at the end of December 1914 it granted 
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Russia’s Minister of Trade and Industry nearly a million rubles (about £100,000) 
to buy and hire additional foreign vessels.26  
The tsarist authorities did not make such allocations lightly. Because of 
Russia’s relative poverty, and in order to stimulate domestic production, they 
had long been in the habit of trying to reduce the country’s overseas purchases. 
In June 1895, for example, Witte had written at length to State Secretary A. N. 
Kulomzin to complain that the extent of Russia’s foreign orders in the year 1894 
contravened an edict of 6 October 1866 whose purpose had been to keep 
foreign orders in check.27 Ministers knew, in other words, that they had to tread 
carefully when they wanted to buy overseas. Perhaps for that reason, within 
weeks of the outbreak of World War One the Navy Minister proposed raising 
foreign currency by exporting timber from Archangel to England.28 Russian 
exports, however, could not possibly have raised enough to pay for everything 
the country needed. The story of the tsarist authorities’ alternative approach to 
money-raising in the First World War (which, broadly speaking, took the form of  
borrowing from Britain), has been told many times.29 In June 1917 the imperial 
regime’s successor, Russia’s Provisional Government, summarized the 
enormous wartime debts incurred by its predecessor.30  
P. L. Bark, the last imperial Minister of Finances, spelled out the 
implications of Russia’s indebtedness even as he arranged the loans that 
increased it. At the ministerial meeting of 17/30 September 1915 at which he 
reported his most important wartime financial agreement with Britain, he 
emphasized the need for Russian governmental agencies to minimize their 
foreign orders. He had raised a great deal of money, but he felt Russia should 
spend it cautiously. He ‘consider[ed] it his duty to insist that, in future, orders 
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other than those which relate directly to immediate current needs of state 
defence be distributed within the Empire’. Russia, he said, was rich in raw 
materials. Although it had shown in the first year of the war that it could produce 
some of the manufactured goods it needed, it should be producing more. The 
Ministry of Finances, Bark declared, was ready to make ‘all attainable sacrifices’ 
to promote domestic development, because it felt that they would be repaid a 
hundred-fold in the near future. Fellow ministers responded by pointing out that 
Russia had been in the habit of placing orders abroad because foreign firms 
were quicker and cheaper. They acknowledged, however, that ordering abroad 
created a vicious circle, for the more the country placed orders abroad, the less 
likely native firms were to invest in the equipment they needed to fulfil such 
orders at home. Consequently, the war ‘demonstrated the backwardness of our 
industry ... and the many respects in which we are alarmingly dependent on 
foreigners in such a vital sphere as the defence of the state’. The Council of 
Ministers concluded that it must do more to encourage domestic industry and 
reduce the number of Russia’s foreign orders.31 
 In these circumstances, buying icebreakers abroad was justifiable only if it 
was essential. Unfortunately (from the point of view of Russia’s balance of 
payments), it was essential. Buying pre-existing vessels from Canada was not 
going to be sufficient. Although, by March 1915, a total of seventeen 
icebreaking vessels of one kind or another were on duty at Archangel,32 Britain 
still had to risk using Jupiter, a guardship from the river Tyne in north-east 
England, to get through the ice of the White Sea at about that time.33 
Consequently, the tsar’s ministers went beyond the million rubles they had 
voted in December 1914 and showed many further signs in 1915, 1916, and 
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1917 of their willingness, whatever the cautionary notes sounded by the 
Minister of Finances, to spend money abroad on the construction, not merely 
the purchase, of icebreaking equipment.34 
 For their new icebreakers they turned not, in the main, to Canada, but to 
north-east England, a heavily industrial region well located for dealings with 
Russia by virtue of being at the western end of both the maritime arc between 
Archangel and Britain and the Baltic route between St Petersburg and Britain. 
The price of energy in the region’s capital, Newcastle upon Tyne, had been 
lower in 1800 than anywhere else in the world.35 Coal had promoted the 
region’s industrial development. By the end of the nineteenth century, its export 
trade was diverse.36 Its business links with the tsarist empire were numerous. It 
was no accident that Joseph Wiggins usually set out from north-east England 
when he embarked for the Russian Arctic between the 1870s and the 1890s, or 
that the Archangel-Murman Navigation Company ordered ships to be built 
there. Charles Mitchell of Low Walker near Newcastle began building ships for 
Russia in the 1850s. In the early 1860s, he sent employees to St Petersburg to 
establish Russia’s first-ever yard for the construction of ironclads.37 Another 
Tyneside shipbuilding concern, Hawthorn-Leslie, built many of the new vessels 
in Russia’s emerging ‘Volunteer Fleet’ in the 1880s and 1890s (at one point 
inclining the British government to take an interest in the potential military uses 
of these ostensibly civilian ships).38 The foundation and rapid growth of the 
Tyneside Geographical Society in the 1880s and 1890s showed that, by the end 
of the nineteenth century, not only the economic but even the cultural life of 
north-east England had become international;39 Wiggins’s lectures to the 
Society about his voyages in the Russian Arctic attracted particularly 
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enthusiastic audiences.40 The tsar started appointing Russian subjects to be 
consuls in Newcastle in 1893.41 The Newcastle press took a keen interest in the 
fortunes of the locally built Smolensk when, in confirmation of the British 
government’s suspicions about the ships of Russia’s Volunteer Fleet, it served 
in a military capacity in the Russo-Japanese War.42 In the first few months after 
the outbreak of World War One, the north-east English press often commented 
on Archangel’s trading prospects.43  
 Of the many ships that tsarist Russia acquired from north-east England, 
icebreakers were among the most distinctive. This type of vessel could be said 
to have originated on the River Tyne, for Pilot, the first ship in the class, started 
life as a tug at Charles Mitchell’s Low Walker shipyard in 1862. Although it had 
to be converted before it could start work as an icebreaker at Kronstadt in 1864, 
its original builders may have undertaken the conversion, for, having created St 
Petersburg’s first yard for ironclads at the beginning of the 1860s, Mitchell’s 
men went on building ships there until 1867.44  His brother-in-law and principal 
associate, Henry Swan (who lived in Russia between 1862 and 1865), acquired 
a particular reputation for icebreakers.45 In 1895, at Low Walker on the Tyne, he 
built Saratovskii ledokol, ‘one of the most powerful Ice Breakers in the world’, to 
go with a railway ferry that the firm was constructing for service on the Volga.46 
In January 1896 he secured Russia’s order for the construction at Low Walker 
of what became Baikal, ‘a ferry Steamer for the Trans-Siberian Railway’, an 
icebreaking vessel which, in conjunction with a smaller icebreaker, Angara (built 
at Low Walker two years later), enabled Russia to circumvent the rocky 
southern end of Lake Baikal.47 After visiting St Petersburg at the end of 1897, 
Swan reported that Admiral Makarov had ordered the construction at Low 
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Walker of what became Ermak, ‘a very powerful Ice-Breaker ... which is 
intended for keeping open the Navigation of the Baltic during winter, and also 
for service in the Arctic Ocean, but more particularly to maintain the navigation 
with the rivers of Western Siberia’.48 At its launch in October 1898, Swan drew 
attention to the fact that, ‘By a curious coincidence, it had happened that the 
very first ice-breaker [Pilot] was built in that yard, and they had seen launched 
that day certainly the largest and most important vessel of the kind in the 
world’.49 Responding to a lecture Swan gave about icebreakers to Britain’s 
Institution of Naval Architects in July 1899, Admiral Makarov expressed the view 
that ‘There is no ice so thick that the skill of the English engineer cannot 
overcome it’.50 Although, because of mergers, Swan’s firm had by this time 
changed its name to Armstrong Whitworth, its reputation for icebreakers lived 
on. When Russia turned to Armstrong’s for the largest icebreakers it was to 
order in World War One, it was acting in the spirit of a relationship which went 
back more than fifty years. 
 The first company Russia turned to, however, when it realized in 1915 that 
it could not solve all its problems in the White Sea simply by buying pre-existing 
ships from Canada, was not Armstrong’s but the next-door company on the 
River Tyne, Swan Hunter of Wallsend. Charles Swan, the ‘Swan’ of Swan 
Hunter, was Henry Swan’s brother, and, like Henry, had worked for Charles 
Mitchell in Russia in the 1860s. When he fell off a ferry into the English Channel 
to his death in 1879, Henry told the inquest that he had been on his way home 
from a business trip to St Petersburg, ‘where he had resided for years 
previously’.51 In the hands of his widow and heirs, his company prospered. An 
early twentieth-century Russian study of the world’s principal shipbuilders 
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devoted even more space to it than it devoted to Armstrong’s.52 On occasion, 
the companies collaborated. When, for example, Henry Swan received an order 
from Russia in 1900 for a floating dock to go with the icebreaker and rail ferry 
that his firm had built for Saratov five years earlier, he asked Swan Hunter to 
execute it, on the grounds that Swan’s specialized in this type of equipment and 
could ‘give us a tender at less than our own nett cost would have been’.53  
 But Swan’s also secured Russian orders on its own. Indeed, the reason 
why Russia turned to it for an icebreaker in April 1915 was probably that, unlike 
Armstrong’s, it was active there in the years immediately prior to the First World 
War. The Times of London reported in 1912 that it was ‘superintending the 
construction of what will probably be the largest floating drydock in the world’ at 
Nikolaev in the Russian south.54 In the north, it received an order in December 
1913 from the Archangel-Murman Steam Navigation Company for the 
passenger cargo ship Kolguev, which it was on the point of delivering to 
Archangel when the tsarist authorities accepted that they had to have 
icebreakers built from scratch.55 By then it was already playing an inadvertent 
part in the creation of Archangel’s icebreaker fleet, for it had built the Canadian 
passenger cargo ships Lintrose and Nascopie, both of which Russia was using 
as icebreakers.56 Its direct involvement in White Sea icebreaking, however, 
began in April 1915, when it received the order for Il´ia Muromets, Russia’s first 
wartime icebreaker to be built from scratch.57 Between then and the end of the 
following year it received three more such orders (for Dobrynia Nikitich, Koz´ma 
Minin, and Kniaz´ Pozharskii), as well as orders for the floating docks in which it 
specialized at both Archangel and the even more northerly Kola.58 
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  Thus Swan’s came to play a significant part in the further development of 
the White Sea in the First World War. For two main reasons, however, its ships 
were still not enough to satisfy Russia’s requirements. On the one hand, they 
could not be completed before 1916, which meant that they were not going to 
be available for the second winter of the war. On the other hand, they were 
probably never going to be powerful enough to cope with the worst of the ice 
that faced them, for, whereas, in late 1914, Archangel had benefited from ‘a 
remarkable spell of fine and warm weather just at the time when it was liable to 
be frozen up’,59 the northern winter of 1915-16 was severe. A Swan’s employee 
wrote to his family from Archangel in late November 1915 to say that ‘We are 
having very bad weather here just now and it began to thaw but now it is 
freezing’.60 A British official with an interest in the matter wrote in March 1916 
that the White Sea had been ‘closed considerably longer this winter by ice’.61 
Although, at that point, Maurice Hankey (the Secretary of Britain’s Committee of 
Imperial Defence), Aleksei Polivanov (Russia’s Minister of War), and Sir Alfred 
Knox (Britain’s Ambassador in Petrograd) all seemed to be more troubled by 
the onward despatch of goods from Archangel than by the difficulty of getting 
them there in the first place, Hankey nevertheless noted that Britain ‘decided to 
build some ice-breakers for Archangel’ at this time.62 He could have said more, 
for at the turn of 1915-16 Russia went beyond the orders for newly built 
icebreakers that it had already placed with Swan’s when it bought a substantial 
Canadian icebreaker which was already on the stocks in Montreal and, above 
all, by commissioning Armstrong’s of Newcastle to build Sviatogor and 
Aleksandr Nevskii, the two largest icebreakers of the war.63   
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 Armstrong’s made almost no mention of its work for Russia when it 
summarized its wartime activity in 1919. So far as the White Sea was 
concerned, it spoke only of ‘a Train Ferry Ice-Breaker which was under 
construction for Canada but which was diverted to Russia and used for keeping 
open the passage to Archangel’.64 When, however, Sviatogor and Aleksandr 
Nevskii were being ordered and built, they received close attention. Minutes of 
Armstrong’s Directors’ meetings, Executive Committee, Shipyards Committee 
and Ordnance Committee show that the company pressed to be sure of the 
orders, negotiated keenly about the vessels with the British Admiralty and 
Russia’s representatives in London, grasped that Sviatogor was to be ‘an 
improved “Ermack” ’, started work on the vessel even before the contract for it 
had been signed, asked for and eventually received permission to build 
Aleksandr Nevskii at the new, grand Armstrong Naval Yard at High Walker 
(rather than at the by this time more modest-looking Low Walker), readied 
Sviatogor for sea trials before Christmas 1916, expected to launch Aleksandr 
Nevskii on 10 November 1916 (but actually launched it on 23 December), and 
hoped to have the second of the two vessels ready for trial by the end of 
January 1917.65 In short, when the vessels were on the stocks Armstrong’s 
gave them a high priority. Russia rated them highly too, to judge by the fact that, 
when A. I. Shingarev and V. I. Gurko visited Newcastle in May 1916 on behalf 
of the Russian Duma and State Council (as part of a larger delegation which 
was touring Britain and France to assess the extent of the allies’ commitment to 
the war), they called on Armstrong’s but not on Swan’s.66  
 At the time of the parliamentarians’ visit, contacts between Russia and 
north-east England were more or less at their peak. Not all of them had to do 
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with shipbuilding, for Russia sent the industrial chemist Nikolai Nikitin to the 
region in 1916 to learn about poison gas.67 Nor were all of them contacts 
between educated people, for on one occasion interaction between ordinary 
workers of the two countries saved the émigré Russian-German revolutionary 
Heinrich Matthäus Fischer from losing his job as a metalworker at Swan’s. 
Because of his German name, and despite the fact that, after thirteen years in 
England, he had taken out British citizenship, Fischer had been dismissed from 
Armstrong’s soon after the war broke out. Although he got another job at 
Swan’s Neptune Yard, he looked likely to lose that too when hostility to 
Germans peaked in Britain after a submarine sank Lusitania on 7 May 1915. At 
that time, however, Russian seamen were in Newcastle to take the newly built 
Kolguev from Swan’s to the White Sea. When his workmates saw how naturally 
Fischer got on with the Russians, they accepted he was Russian rather than 
German and he kept his job at the Neptune Yard when ‘other old Germans’, 
some of whom had been working there for more than twenty years, were forced 
out.68  
 Newcastle had become Britain’s principal point of exit and entry for people 
who had to make their way to and from Russia. Nikolai Bukharin appears to 
have been arrested in the city in July 1915 for attempting to travel to Russia 
under a false name.69 Aleksandr Shliapnikov, a future Soviet commissar and 
oppositionist, passed through Newcastle on at least two occasions during the 
war.70 Sir Samuel Hoare travelled via Newcastle to join the British Intelligence 
Mission in Petrograd in March 1916.71 At the Anglo-Russian Bureau in 
Petrograd, Russians were asking ‘How much does a ticket to Newcastle cost?’72 
Having learned within a few days of the outbreak of the war that travelling via 
 15 
 
Newcastle was virtually the only way for an individual traveller to get to and from 
Russia, Bernard Pares, England’s leading Slavist, departed and returned via the 
city several times.73 V. D. Nabokov, one of a group of Russian journalists who 
toured Britain in February and March 1916 with a view to convincing Russians 
at home of the depth of Britain’s commitment to the war, recognized ‘the 
dimensions and breadth of England's technical means’ on entering the River 
Tyne,74 and expressed something like astonishment after touring the massive 
undertakings of Palmer’s on the south bank of the river when he was on his way 
home.75  
 Whereas Nabokov was in transit, the budding Russian writer Evgenii 
Zamiatin spent eighteen months of the war in Newcastle working as a naval 
architect. He had acquired some first-hand knowledge of Russia’s northern 
problems in the summer of 1915, when the tsarist Ministry of Trade and Industry 
sent him to the White Sea to conduct a review of harbour facilities at Soroka 
(Belomorsk). Unable to get a hotel room in Archangel on that occasion, he had 
spent a few nights aboard Kanada.76 In the spring of 1916, his superiors sent 
him to north-east England to join the supervisors whom they had been sending 
there since May of the previous year.77 In the early 1930s he was to speak of 
the icebreakers with whose construction he was involved in England in terms of 
Anglo-Russian symbiosis. On the one hand, the ships were quintessentially 
Russian (‘An icebreaker is as Russian as a samovar ... its nose is Russian, 
heavy, broad, like the nose of a peasant from Tambov or Voronezh’78); on the 
other. they owed their existence to British expertise (‘Grandfather Ermak’ was 
still in service, ‘so strongly and reliably did the English build in those days when 
their pound sterling was still strong and reliable’79). His English period had 
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allowed him to combine his two greatest pleasures, shipbuilding and literary 
creation. ‘At night,’ he wrote, ‘at home, when checking the plans of the Lenin [at 
that time Aleksandr Nevskii], I would listen to the explosions of the bombs, 
sometimes far off, sometimes near, and write my novel about the English, 
Islanders.’ 80 A decade and a half after his return to Russia, in Leningrad, he 
told a visitor from north-east England that when he was in Newcastle he had 
‘liked the people very much’.81 At first sight, it seems that his time in England 
was a high point in his life. 
 It could also be said to have been a high point in the history of the Anglo-
Russian relationship, for towards the end of 1916 everything was apparently in 
place to improve the passage of war goods from the West to Archangel. The 
programme of icebreaker construction that Russia had initiated in north-east 
England was coming to a head. Britain and Russia looked to be on the point of 
conquering the ice that cut them off from one another. Can it be argued, 
therefore, that Russia’s British icebreakers were a success? Apart from bringing 
British and Russian subjects together in the course of their construction (and so 
helping to allay Russian suspicions that the western partners in the wartime 
alliance were not fighting Germany and Austria-Hungary to the best of their 
ability), they seem to have played a part in the considerable improvement of 
supply at Archangel, which, having exported ten times as much as it imported in 
1913, imported twenty times as much in 1917 as it had imported four years 
earlier.82 
 Unfortunately, these conclusions are too sanguine. Even the dramatic 
improvement of supply at Archangel was a mixed blessing, for getting the goods 
out of the Russian north to the places for which they were intended never 
 17 
 
became easy. Writing from Archangel in January 1917, Major B. M. Hallward of 
the British army pointed to:  
the natural difficulties of the port and a realisation of the impossibility of 
procuring in war time the equipment for the expeditious handling of four 
millions of cargo [sic] in a port which before the war contained one full 
sized berth and two smaller quays.83   
Although Hallward believed that ‘the system which the work of the last two 
years has evolved is in the main the best suited to cope with the problems that 
present themselves’, he admitted that ‘persons who have not had to do directly 
with the conditions at Archangel’ might think that ‘more efficacious methods [of 
onward delivery] might be found’. 84 Although, according to an estimate of early 
1917, Archangel’s capacity for the onward despatch of imports was more than 
twice as great as the combined capacity of all three of Russia’s alternative 
import routes (Vladivostok, Finland-Sweden-Norway, Murman),85 it was still 
clear, at the time the British officer wrote his report, that the improvements 
which had taken place in respect of supply at Archangel in the first two and a 
half years of the war were insufficient to meet Russia’s needs.   
 One reason why they had not been more substantial was the way in which 
the Anglo-Russian alliance operated in Britain. Finding money to buy goods in 
the West was only one of the many issues which Russia had to resolve when 
trying to maintain its effort on the eastern front in World War One. Another was 
putting procedures in place to spend the money which it raised. The 
complicated way in which Russia organized its foreign orders via London in 
World War One has been recounted elsewhere,86 but the mere names of the 
bodies which vetted the orders – the Anglo-Russian Committee of 1914-15 
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(chaired by a Grand Duke who had been exiled from Russia for marrying 
beneath himself), its successor, the Russian Governmental Committee (which 
Petrograd brought into being after realizing that the body chaired by the Grand 
Duke had not been very energetic), and the London-based Commission 
Internationale de Ravitaillement (to which the Russian Governmental 
Committee reported) – strike fear into students of Russian bureaucracy. Whilst 
battle raged in Petrograd about whether Russia’s wartime Unions of Towns and 
Zemstva should be allowed representation on the country’s London purchasing 
agency,87 the agency itself grew in size rather than efficiency. In February 1918, 
a Russian official in London told the British Treasury that, at its maximum extent 
in September and October of the previous year, the Russian Governmental 
Committee had employed 738 staff.88 One of its employees recollected that, 
because it was ‘heavily overstaffed’, he and his colleagues  
worked in a leisurely fashion, with plenty of time for gossip, newspapers, 
and discussions on the subject of the war ... We wrote minutes to the War 
Office asking for struts and cocoa, boots and aluminium, silk and guns; 
these we shipped to Archangel and felt that we had done our bit. How 
were we to know that the Archangel Railway was breaking down and that 
expensive munitions were, for lack of sheds, dumped down anywhere and 
were sinking under their weight into the marshy ground? Our power of 
self-suggestion was still unimpaired, and because life in London was so 
calm, we believe that things at home were gradually getting better.89 
When, in the case of orders for ships, one adds to Russia’s London officials the 
procedures of the British Admiralty (which decided the uses to which British 
shipyards were to be put), and, in the case of the orders for Sviatogor and its 
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predecessors, the procedures of the companies in Newcastle which built them, 
it becomes easy to see that the construction of Russia’s icebreakers did not 
take place as quickly as it might have done. Although the records of Swan’s and 
Armstrong’s in Newcastle provide only a few indicators of the fact that 
shipbuilders in north-east England sometimes felt they were at the end of a 
rather long chain, they do show, for example, that the Admiralty did not give 
Armstrong’s a free hand in determining which of its shipyards was to be 
employed for the construction of Aleksandr Nevskii, and that it put pressure on 
Armstrong’s to finish its share of the work on the icebreakers sooner than it 
easily could.90  
 In view of its size, furthermore, Russia’s programme of icebreaker 
construction would have been demanding in any circumstances. The ships in 
the present paper were only the most important parts of it. When the Russian 
Governmental Committee was being wound up in 1918, an official said that the 
final report of the ‘Commercial Ports Section’ was going to speak of an 
‘icebreaker construction programme which comprises 9 icebreakers with a total 
value of roughly £1,000,000, and orders for 82 shore cranes and spares, 3 
floating cranes, 30 lorries and spares and various other orders with a total value 
of approximately £1,500,000. In this connection 180-200 applications were 
made and about 300 orders placed which spread over the period from 1915-
1918’.91 Such a programme would have been difficult to complete at the best of 
times. 
 To cut a long story short, only one of the icebreakers in the present paper, 
Sviatogor, reached Russia in time to be included on the official shiplists of the 
tsarist empire.92 Nor was its inclusion really justfied, for at the time of the tsar’s 
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abdication the vessel was still in England, where its sea trials were continuing 
because its rudder was not obeying the wheel.93 Aleksandr Nevskii, meanwhile, 
became ready for active duty only after Russia’s withdrawal from the First World 
World War and was commandeered by the British Navy early in 1918 without 
ever having served pre-Bolshevik Russia.94 
 By the time Russia’s British-built icebreakers were nearing completion, 
war-weariness in Russia was overtaking the allies’ best efforts. Indeed, if  
Sviatogor had arrived in Russia before the abdication of Nicholas II, it would 
probably have made a negative rather than a positive contribution to the tsarist 
war effort, for, according to Heinrich Matthäus Fischer (the émigré Russian-
German metalworker who was working in the shipyards in Newcastle upon 
Tyne when it was being built), its Russian crew had been radicalized even prior 
to the ship’s departure from England.95 Shortly after it departed for Russia, a 
British official involved in the repatriation of Russian subjects from Britain under 
the Anglo-Russian Military Service Convention of July 1917 attributed a delay in 
the despatch of eleven hundred Russians from Newcastle to Russia in early 
October 1917 partly to ‘certain trouble ... from the Russian crews’ which were 
manning the ships earmarked for their deportation.96 It looks as if the dissident 
sentiments which so distinguished Russian sailors in 1917 were in evidence 
even among those of their number who were far from home.97  
 It is also possible to present Zamiatin’s Newcastle phase in a less than 
attractive light. The writer’s apparently fond memories of his Newcastle period 
may have improved with the passage of time, for, to judge by some of the 
letters he wrote in 1916, he was not always content when he was in England, 
and he certainly did not represent the country positively in some of the fiction he 
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completed after returning to Russia. When resident in Newcastle, he found the 
city ‘repulsive’ and ‘big but impenetrably boring’; ‘All the streets,’  he wrote, ‘all 
the dwelling-places are identical, imagine – completely identical like the grain 
barns by the Alexandr Nevskii Monastery in St Petersburg’.98 The Islanders, a 
novella he wrote in Newcastle and published in 1918 shortly after returning to 
Russia, satirizes the drab uniformity of the suburb in which he lived and the 
local priest’s ‘Testament of Compulsory Salvation’ (a timetable for living from 
which deviation was a sin).99 His novel We, a futuristic ‘anti-utopia’ of 1920 
which appeared in print for the first time in 1924 (in an English translation in 
New York),100 may have drawn its sense of regimentation from what, to 
Zamiatin, was the ghastly world of Newcastle’s ordered terraced houses and 
industrial gloom.101 Zamiatin was no Bolshevik,102 but he may not have been a 
very committed Anglophile either. 
 If Zamiatin’s career is anything to go by, it might be argued that, far from 
bringing Britain and Russia closer together, Russia’s orders for icebreakers 
from England in the First World War actually drove the two countries further 
apart. This can be argued in material as well as metaphorical terms, for, in a 
sense, the ships not only did not do all the good they were supposed to have 
done, but did Russia harm. In the Civil War in the Russian north of the years 
1918-20, they fought mainly for the Western powers rather than the country 
which had ordered their construction. The British brought Aleksandr Nevskii with 
them when they arrived at Archangel in August 1918. Revolutionaries sank 
Sviatogor in the mouth of the Dvina in the hope of slowing them down, but did 
so ineffectively, with the result that, after some disagreement between the 
British and the French, the former were able to add the ship to their forces.103 
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Alongside Aleksandr Nevskii, and with the assistance of Koz´ma Minin and 
Kniaz´ Pozharskii (two of Swan’s icebreakers), Sviatogor spent the year 1918-
19 expediting Western maritime activity between Archangel and Murmansk.104  
In view of the fact that this was perhaps the one year in the icebreakers’ pre-
Soviet history that they performed the tasks for which they had been 
commissioned, it is ironic that they did so not on behalf of Russia’s central 
government, but in opposition to it.  
 Because, in the Russian Civil War, the British icebreakers and their 
Canadian precursors at Archangel still appeared from time to time in north-east 
England (for repair, to take on supplies, to convey troops to the Russian north), 
they still exemplified the operation of the northern maritime arc between 
England and Russia to which this paper has referred. Some strange 
conjunctions resulted, most remarkably, perhaps, Russia and influenza, for the 
worldwide influenza epidemic of 1918-19 arrived in Archangel in September 
1918 when American soldiers disembarked there at the end of a voyage from 
Newcastle upon Tyne.105 Nikolai Gubskii, the Russian official who had whiled 
away his time at the Russian Governmental Committee in wartime London, 
moved to the tsarist consulate in Newcastle after employment in London came 
to an end (for tsarist consulates went on being recognized by western countries 
until the early 1920s), and there became a close friend of Captain Mukalov of 
Kanada. Newcastle’s climate, Gubskii observed, had an unfortunate effect on 
the crews for which Mukalov was responsible; ‘They were all men from 
Archangel and Murmansk, used to temperatures of twenty, thirty and forty 
below zero, yet in Newcastle they went about shivering and complaining of the 
cold. “This is far worse than the frost at home,” they said.’106 Heinrich Matthäus 
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Fischer, Newcastle’s émigré Russian-German, began thinking about returning 
to the land of his birth soon after icebreakers made their last voyage from north-
east England to north Russia at the end of the Western involvement there.107 
 The first phase of the icebreakers’ lives, when they were ordered and built 
with the object of promoting the Anglo-Russian war effort, had illustrated the 
fact that, for the sake of trade or security or harmony, Britain and Russia have 
sometimes worked together. At the local level, it was one of the last significant 
chapters in the long story of business connections between north-east England 
and Russia.108 On the other hand, the second phase of the ships’ lives, when 
they served under British command in the Russian Civil War, exemplified the 
antipathy that has also been a prominent feature of the Anglo-Russian 
relationship. Thus the two phases reflected the principal facets of the dealings 
Britain and Russia have had with one another. Shifts from friendship to enmity 
and back again have been a perennial feature of their interaction. 
 The end of the Russian Civil War was not, of course, the end of the lives 
of Russia’s British-built icebreakers. Koz’ma Minin and Il´ia Muromets became 
the French vessels Castor and Pollux. A subordinate purpose of the present 
paper has been to provide the early history of Sviatogor in order to 
contextualize the much better-known story of its later fame. After the Russian 
Civil War, Britain used it in boom clearance at Scapa Flow and subsequently 
loaned it to Norway for use on a rescue mission in the Russian Arctic,109 before 
returning it to Russia in the wake of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty of 1921.110 
Re-named Krasin in honour of the Russian negotiator of that treaty, the ship 
became world-famous when it rescued some of the crew of the Italian balloonist 
Umberto Nobile after the failure of his attempt to over-fly the Arctic in 1928 (an 
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attempt which led to the death of Roald Amundsen, who had also been looking 
for the expeditionaries).111  One of the characters in The Foundation Pit, Andrei 
Platonov’s novel of 1929-30 about collectivization, asked: ‘Which is better – the 
ice-breaker Krasin or the Kremlin?’112 Thus the ship achieved fame in literature 
as well as in life. In World War II it was part of the celebrated Atlantic convoy 
PQ-15.113 It is now probably the third or fourth most famous of all Russian ships, 
after the little boat which Peter the Great found on the lake at Izmailovskoe in 
north-east Moscow in the 1690s (the centrepiece of the Navy Museum in St 
Petersburg), the cruiser Aurora (which fired blanks on the Winter Palace in St 
Petersburg at the point of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917), and perhaps 
the battleship Potemkin (whose mutiny at Odessa in 1905 was celebrated in film 
by Sergei Eisenstein). Today, as a tourist attraction by the Mining Institute on 
the River Neva in St Petersburg, it sometimes puts people from Russia and 
Britain in touch with each other and so at last fulfils the purpose of promoting 
international harmony for which it was designed. 
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